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On June 5, Guatemala's Congress elected former Human Rights Ombudsman Ramiro de Leon
Carpio to serve out the remainder of former president Jorge Serrano's term in office, thereby
putting an end to nearly two weeks of political uncertainty. The agreement which led to De Leon
Carpio's election, based on broad national consensus, eliminated any possibility of the country's
powerful military directly taking over the government. It also paved the way for a peaceful return
to institutional rule, which had seemed nearly impossible during the previous ten days. De Leon
Carpio now faces a series of daunting challenges which will test his ability to hold together the
consensus which swept him to power. Just eight days after assuming near-dictatorial powers in a
May 25 coup d'etat, former president Jorge Serrano was himself deposed in a military-led palace
coup (for previous coverage see NotiSur 05/28/93). Serrano's departure was applauded by the
broad array of forces which had united in opposition to his coup. But the resulting power vacuum
quickly generated a new set of tensions and created widespread concerns that the military might
step in to fill the void. As of June 3, over 48 hours after military officers had ushered a fuming
Serrano out of the presidential palace, the country was still without a head of state, as leaders from
the military, political parties, the private sector, and the popular movement struggled to find a
formula to overcome the institutional impasse. On the streets of the capital, protesters who had
been pushing for Serrano's ouster led by trade union leaders and by Nobel peace laureate Rigoberta
Menchu began demanding a "civilian solution" to the crisis. The original agreement for displacing
Serrano and choosing a successor had been announced on June 1 by Defense Minister Gen. Jose
Domingo Garcia. According to Garcia, the army decided to act on a petition by the Constitutional
Court to force Serrano from power. Garcia added that, after consultations with military leaders,
both Serrano and his vice president, Gustavo Espina, had offered their resignations. Under the
agreement, Congress was to be purged of between 20 and 30 deputies accused of corruption or of
having supported Serrano's coup. After the purge, Congress would then proceed to elect a new
head of state to serve out the remainder of Serrano's term. In the interim, in order to maintain a
semblance of institutional continuity, Garcia announced that Espina's resignation would be put
on hold and the vice president would temporarily serve as head of state until a new president was
chosen by Congress and sworn in. That agreement collapsed less than 24 hours later when Espina,
flanked by military bodyguards, convoked a press conference to proclaim himself president. Espina
a close personal friend of Serrano's and a fellow member of the former head of state's Shadai church
denied that he had ever submitted his resignation. He insisted that under the constitution he was
clearly entitled to the presidency. Shortly after Espina's announcement, Gen. Garcia Samayoa
confirmed that the military had decided to back Espina as the new head of state. But Espina's
power grab quickly began to generate the same degree of united opposition which had forced
Serrano to step down. Within hours of Espina's surprise announcement, leaders from the private
sector, the traditional political parties, and the popular movement had all issued declarations
condemning Espina's move, while thousands of protesters marched through the streets proclaiming
their rejection of Espina as a coup plotter and pawn of the military. Following vain attempts on
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June 2 and June 3 to convoke Congress in order to swear him in as the new head of state, it became
clear that Espina's power bid was doomed. Then, on June 4, the Constitutional Court issued a
ruling which paved the way for what was to become the definitive solution to the nearly two-week
old crisis. The Court ruled that Espina, by virtue of having served as an accomplice in Serrano's
coup, was barred by the constitution from serving as president. The Constitutional Court ruling
read: "[Espina] cannot opt for the position of president of the republic [because he] notoriously
participated in the illegitimate acts of the executive branch" during Serrano's coup. The ruling called
on Congress to convene in extraordinary session in order to elect a new president within 24 hours.
The Constitutional Court's ruling thus paved the way for negotiations to return to institutional
rule without Espina. In fact, during the 24 hours prior to the Court ruling, a deal had already been
brokered by the newly-formed Forum for National Consensus (Instancia Nacional del Consenso)
over the terms for restoring the institutional rule of law. Demonstrating an unprecedented degree
of unity among Guatemalan civilian sectors, the Forum brought together business leaders from the
powerful Coordinating Committee of Commercial, Industrial and Financial Associations (Comite
Coordinador de Asociaciones Comerciales, Industriales y Financieras, CACIF); 60 trade union
federations and popular organizations affiliated with a newly-formed "Multisector" umbrella group;
five political parties; and several federations of cooperatives. The following parties participated
in the Forum: Christian Democrat (Democracia Cristiana, DC); National Center Union (Union
del Centro Nacional, UCN); National Advancement Party (Partido de Avanzada Nacional, PAN);
Socialist Democratic Party (Partido Socialista Democratico, PSD); and the Guatemalan Republican
Front (Frente Republicano Guatemalteco, FRG). On June 4, leaders representing different groups
from the Forum held a press conference to announce the plan for a return to constitutional rule,
hammered out during prolonged negotiations among Forum participants. The plan's central
elements included: * Resignation of interim president Espina. * Selection by Congress of a new
president from among a list of three candidates to be submitted by the Forum. The president
would then propose a slate of three candidates for vice president, which would again be subject
to election by Congress. * Integration of a transition government based on national consensus.
* Purge and restructuring of the executive, legislative and judicial branches. * Reforms to laws
regulating elections and political parties. * Promulgation of new legislation to facilitate participation
by civilian sectors in political decision- making. During the press conference, Forum leaders said
that Espina had agreed to resign. They added that the Forum had presented its proposal to members
of the army high command, who "reacted favorably." The following day, June 5, Forum members
held a new round of meetings to agree on a list of three proposed candidates for president. They
eventually agreed to submit the names of Human Rights Attorney General Ramiro de Leon Carpio,
Electoral Tribunal president Arturo Herbruger, and former foreign minister Mario Quinonez
Amezquita. De Leon Carpio, one of the country's most widely respected public figures, was elected
with 106 out of 115 congressional votes later the same day. Quinonez's name was never actually
put to nomination, while Herbruger withdrew from the contest after coming in second behind
De Leon Carpio in a first round of voting. De Leon Carpio will complete the remainder of the
term to which Serrano was elected, through January 14, 1996. In his inaugural address, De Leon
Carpio emphasized the theme which is expected to dominate his period in office: the need to
govern on the basis of consensus among the country's political, social, and economic forces. "I am
convinced that there is sufficient time in my presidential term to create the conditions that will
permit a deepening of the democratic process," said De Leon Carpio in his inaugural address. "I
cannot hide my great satisfaction...but at the same time I feel a great responsibility. I feel satisfied
not so much at being president of the republic, but at being the man they chose to bring about
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Guatemalan unity to avoid a violent explosion...[Guatemala has] a great, new opportunity perhaps
the last chance of the present century to set the correct course so that we can all construct a new
nation." During the same speech, and in comments to reporters the following day, De Leon Carpio
spelled out some of the objectives of his administration: * In what he promised would be an ongoing
struggle against corruption, De Leon Carpio announced that the first administrative measure of
the new government was the total elimination of the president's "discretionary budget" (fondos
confidenciales). That budget which totalled over US$15 million per year under the previous two
civilian administrations had become a potent symbol of corruption at the highest levels of the
government, since neither Serrano nor ex-president Vinicio Cerezo were required to report on how
the money was spent. * A purge of all government institutions, including the army. * Consolidation
of the country's democratic institutions, which would include convoking a national dialogue aimed
at finding new mechanisms to allow the State to become more responsive to the needs of civil
society. * De Leon Carpio said that, after consolidating democracy, the number one priority of his
government will be fighting poverty, with special attention given to health and education. The
President added that his government plans to launch a massive literacy campaign, "which takes
into account the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural reality of our country." * De Leon Carpio promised
to lend full support to all organizations charged with defending human rights and respect for the
constitution. In particular, he promised total freedom of the press. Nevertheless, he said peace talks
with the guerrillas would not be an immediate priority, since he vowed to create the conditions
that would naturally lead to an end to the war. Clearly, the most serious challenge to De Leon
Carpio's government will come from the military. At first, both the new President and military
leaders took pains to downplay the potential for conflict. De Leon Carpio insisted that his prior
difficulties with the military were directly linked to his position as Human Rights Ombudsman,
adding that there was no reason to assume he would run into such problems as President. On June
7, however, De Leon Carpio announced a major reshuffling of the top military leadership. He fired
Defense Minister Gen. Garcia Samayoa, replacing him with the next in line in the military command
structure, former armed forces Chief of Staff Gen. Roberto Perussina. De Leon Carpio said Gen.
Mario Enriquez would move up to take Perussina's place as Chief of Staff, while Gen. Julio Otzoy
was appointed deputy Defense Minister. Meanwhile, the powerful head of the Presidential Chief of
Staff, Gen. Francisco Ortega Menaldo, was replaced by Otto Perez Molina. Gen. Ortega was a key
ally of Serrano and was widely believed to have backed Espina's bid for the presidency following
Serrano's ouster. Meanwhile, De Leon Carpio's ascension to the presidency received widespread
approval internationally. Governments throughout Latin America and in Europe were uniformly
positive in their assessment of the manner in which the Guatemalan political crisis was resolved,
pledging full backing for De Leon Carpio's administration. Particularly strong support came from
the US. On June 8, US deputy Secretary of State Clifton Wharton and assistant secretary for InterAmerican affairs Bernard Aronson travelled to Guatemala City where they met for 90 minutes
with De Leon Carpio. The two praised the new President and pledged to step up US support for
negotiations between the Guatemalan government and rebels. "It is a historic achievement that the
Guatemalan people peacefully confronted the extra-constitutional steps taken by the former leaders
[Serrano and Espina], and have successfully restored a democratic government through peaceful,
legal and constitutional means," Wharton declared. Washington had suspended its aid programs
to Guatemala, worth about US$48 million. It had also threatened to suspend Guatemala's trade
privileges under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and the Caribbean Basin Initiative
(CBI), pending a resolution of the crisis. During their visit, Wharton and Aronson confirmed that
all sanctions had been lifted. Meanwhile, the ultimate fate of Serrano and Espina remains unclear.
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After initially being escorted to El Salvador on June 2 on board a Guatemalan air force plane,
Serrano later moved on to Panama where he was offered political asylum by President Guillermo
Endara. Espina took refuge in the Costa Rican embassy in Guatemala City. Attorney General
Edgar Tuna has called for the arrest and prosecution of Serrano, Espina, and Interior Minister
Francisco Perdomo, on charges that include violation of the constitution, rebellion, usurping of
public functions, and misuse of public funds. Despite suggestions by De Leon Carpio that Serrano
and Espina should be granted amnesty, popular sectors as well as some members of Congress
adamantly insisted the two must face trial. On June 8, a judge in Guatemala City placed a freeze on
25 bank accounts in Serrano's name. Although the judge's order did not specify an amount, local
media reports indicate Serrano's accounts in Guatemala and abroad may contain deposits totaling
as much as US$19 million. Serrano's salary as president was equal to about US$5,000 per month, and
the ex-president was reportedly in debt before he took office in January 1991. Meanwhile, sources
at the foreign ministry indicated that a request was being prepared to seek Serrano's extradition
from Panama. (Sources: Agence France-Presse, 06/02/93, 06/03/93, 06/04/93, 06/06/93; United Press
International, 06/03/93, 06/04/93, 06/06/93, 06/07/93; Agencia Centroamericana de Noticias-Spanish
news service EFE, 06/04/93; Reuter, 06/06/93; Associated Press, 06/08/93)
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